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Nineteen Minutes of Horror: Insights from the Scorpions Execution Video
Iva Vukušić

Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands
Introduction
The so-called Scorpions video is one of the most disturbing audiovisual traces of the wars in the
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It shows one of the many mass executions that followed the fall of
the United Nations’ protected area around the town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, in mid-July
1995. The crime itself was a culmination of the brutal war that was ripping Bosnia and Herzegovina
apart from the spring of 1992. The video, described as shocking after it emerged, shows men in
dark uniforms, some wearing red berets, executing six men, three of whom were underage, in
a deserted hamlet in the hills of Bosnia.1 That video is a key piece of evidence used to prosecute
perpetrators for the executions committed in the aftermath of the Bosnian Serb Army entering the
town, led by its charismatic, yet brutish commander, Ratko Mladić.2 Mladić, his subordinates, and
civilian counterparts like Radovan Karadžić have been tried and convicted at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, and this video is part of the trial
record in many of those cases.3
The video was first shown during the trial of the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, in June
2005, and it immediately caused a storm, both in international and Serbian media outlets.4 Milošević
died before judgment, less than a year later, and the storm was short-lived, especially in Serbian
society.5 If it can be said that it led to a sort of reckoning, it was a brief one.6 However, perpetrators
have been convicted, some for committing genocide, due also to this crucial piece of evidence.
Apart from that judicial value, the video tells us a lot about the nature of the crime itself, and
the attitudes perpetrators held towards their victims. That is why this article aims to revisit those
crucial nineteen minutes of video footage, and dissect it; with a purpose of understanding what it
tells us about the executions following the capture of Srebrenica, but also about the prosecution of
international crimes.7 In this article, the focus is on those who actually participated in the killings,
in the precise moments when the massacre was committed, and not those who sent them to fulfill
this task. Sources from the proceedings against those pulling the trigger will be drawn on most.
In sum, the primary questions concern the characteristics of the act of execution, and those who
commit it, as well as the importance of this particular video as evidence in court.
The Crime After The Fall of Srebrenica
All my close relatives, my entire family, was under the ground.
I had no hope whatsoever.
There was no one I could wait for.

1

Melissa Block, “Execution Video Shocks Serbia,” NPR, June 3, 2005, accessed July 18, 2017. http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=4679742.

2

Prosecutor v. Mladic, Fourth Amended Indictment, December 16, 2011, IT-09-92-PT, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/mladic/ind/en/111216.pdf .

3

Srebrenica-related ICTY cases are against accused: Dražen Erdemović, Slobodan Milošević, Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan
Jokić, Radislav Krstić, Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Momir Nikolić, Dragan Obrenović, Momčilo Perišić, Popović
et al., Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, and Zdravko Tolimir. More information available at the ICTY website,
accessed July 22, 2017, http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4.

4

Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Initial Indictment Kosovo, May 22, 1999, IT-99-37, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm.

5

Eric Gordy, Guilt, Responsibility and Denial: The Past at Stake in Post-Milosevic Serbia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 124.

6

Vladimir Petrović, “A Crack in the Wall of Denial: The Scorpions Video in and out of the Courtroom,” in Narratives of
Justice In and Out of the Courtroom: Former Yugoslavia and Beyond, ed. Dubravka Žarkov and Marlies Glasius (New York:
Springer, 2014), 103.

7

The precise nineteen minutes can be accessed here, along with other, related evidence material: http://srebrenica.senseagency.com/en/. The transcript of the video is available in English.
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The truth had come out,
And it became apparent that I’m really alone.
Mirsada Malagić, witness at the ICTY trial of Ratko Mladić, May 16, 20138

Before this video was shown in court, much was already known about what happened in those
days following the fall of Srebrenica.9 That is largely due to the work of the investigative team at the
Prosecutor’s Office at the ICTY, and in particular its lead investigator on the case, Jean-Rene Ruez.10
He led his team, for years, tirelessly, in putting together this puzzle. Ruez was already in Bosnia
in the weeks following the Bosnian Serb takeover of the territory, as it was becoming increasingly
clear that thousands of men were unaccounted for.11 His team of investigators, along with analysts,
and prosecutors at the ICTY managed to reconstruct the sequence of events up to knowing what
important actors were doing, hour per hour. Before the video was released, several people pleaded
guilty at the ICTY for crimes related to Srebrenica, and gave statements about the event and their
participation in it.12 Early on, it was Dražen Erdemović, member of the Tenth Sabotage Detachment
of the Bosnian Serb Army, who came forward in 1996, and shed much-needed light as to what
happened at execution sites such as Branjevo farm, and in Pilica, in eastern Bosnia.13
It was known, in 2005, that thousands were executed in areas across northeastern Bosnia in
the week following the fall of Srebrenica, many of them around Zvornik. The victims were not
only pre-war Srebrenica area residents, but also refugees from eastern Bosnia towns that fled to
Srebrenica, to escape from the violent campaigns to expel them, that began in 1992. In July 1995,
victims were hunted down, captured, and executed, sometimes weeks after the town fell. It was
known that victims were killed in large numbers after being bussed to, at times, remote locations,
and then buried at or close to the scene of the crime, often by civilians drafted through Bosnian
Serb local authorities, manning heavy machinery. This was known because several men testified in
court about getting rid of those bodies.14 The few survivors came forward and spoke in court in The
Hague, sometimes with their identities concealed, about what they lived through.15 Researchers,
journalists, and activists collected information, and published it.16
Testimonies emerged that corroborated those horrific accounts and added stories of incredible
suffering, almost too difficult to put into words.17 Those left behind spoke about the effects the
crime had on their lives, recounting how much they missed their children,18 and how not knowing

8

Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladic, testimony of witness Mirsada Malagić, May 16, 2013, IT-09-92. Transcript page 11218, lines 2123, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/trans/en/130516IT.htm.

9

Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, testimony of witness Obrad Stevanović, June 1, 2005, IT-02-54, accessed July 30, 2017,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/050601IT.htm.

10

Sonja Biserko, “Intervju sa Žan-Rene Ruezom: Srebrenica je više od tragedije,” in Srebrenica: Od poricanja do priznanja,
ed. Sonja Biserko (Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2005), 738.

11

United Nations Security Council, Press Release SC/6122/Rev. 1 3591st Meeting (Night), November 9, 1995, accessed July 10,
2017, http://www.un.org/press/en/1995/19951109.sc6122.r1.html.

12

See ICTY cases against Momir Nikolic (IT-02-60/1), Dragan Obrenovic (IT-01-43), accessed July 30 2017, http://www.icty.
org/en/action/cases/4.

13

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22, accessed July 30 2017, http://www.icty.org/cases/party/683/4.

14

Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, testimony of witness Krsto Simić, February 23, and 24, 2004, IT-02-60, accessed July 20
2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/trans/en/040223IT.htm, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_
jokic/trans/en/040224ED.htm.

15

Testimonies of several survivors are available here, accessed July 20, 2017, http://srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/.

16

The report on Srebrenica was published by NIOD, the Dutch Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in
Amsterdam, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.niod.nl/en/srebrenica-report/report.

17

Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovic et al., testimony of witness PW-101, February 22, 2007, IT-05-88. Transcript pages 75817582, accessed July 28, 2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/trans/en/070222ED.htm; Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladic,
testimony of witness RM-313, June 6, 2014, IT-09-92, accessed July 30, 2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/trans/
en/130606ED.htm.

18

Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33, testimony of witness DD, and other testimonies of survivors are available here,
accessed July 28, 2017, http://srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/.
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where they ended up haunted them.19 Experts in archeology, pathology, and anthropology spoke
in court about the efforts the Bosnian Serb Army put in place about two, three months after, to
hide the crime.20 Their re-digging of large primary mass graves included taking out the bodies that
had been decomposing already, again with heavy machinery, and transporting them to remote
locations.21 This process led to the bodies being ripped apart, which made the subsequent process
of their identification, and return to families for a proper burial, that much harder. There were
instances in which one person’s remains were found in three, or even four different mass graves—
sometimes with some bones still missing.22 Nevertheless, the International Commission on Missing
Persons (ICMP) has managed to recover, and identify, the remains of more than 6,930 people, and,
by July 2015, 6,241 have been buried in the Memorial in Potočari, just across the road from the UN
base where many sought refuge.23
In 2005, all of that was known to those who cared about knowing it. However, what the Scorpions
video showed was, for the first time, and in only a few minutes of footage, what it was like for those
men who were captured, and then executed. It showed how they were treated, without mercy, and
the condition that they were in. Their experience, captured on camera, made it possible for those
watching to imagine what those thousands of people went through, in a way that was previously
impossible. The video provided the opportunity to hear, from the mouths of the perpetrators, how
they spoke to the victims. It was no one else, and it was not a recollection after the fact. It was the
perpetrators themselves speaking. The overwhelming amount of evidence collected and verified in
court, of which this video is a crucial part, led to the ICTY and the International Court of Justice,24
describing the executions after the fall of the enclave as a genocide. It is important to remember,
all genocide convictions at the ICTY were related to mass executions after the fall of Srebrenica.25
Theoretical Framework, Approach and Method
Images of mass atrocity have been the subject of study and debate ever since the development of
technology allowed cameras to be carried around to document events. The Second World War, the
horror of the Holocaust and the trials that followed in Nuremberg and elsewhere, made images
of crime available – to judges, but also historians, and the wider public. Much about images has
been discussed, and a central point has been the value of images depicting violence for history, as
well as their probative value. Audiovisual material was crucial to how we think of, and remember,
the Holocaust.26 In court, the first use of film as evidence of mass atrocity was at the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945. 27 Among those films, “Nazi Concentration Camps” is
19

Expert testimony of witness Teufika Ibrahimefendić is available here, accessed July 28, 2017, http://srebrenica.senseagency.com/en/.

20

Expert testimony of several anthropologists, archeologists and pathologists is available here, accessed July 28, 2017,
http://srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/.

21

The distinction between primary and secondary graves are explained well in the expert witness testimony clips
available here, accessed July 28, 2017, http://srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/.

22

Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, testimony of witness Amor Mašović, April 10, 2012, IT-95-5/18. Transcript page 27300,
lines 12-20, accessed July 27, 2017, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/120410ED.htm. Mašović is the
Chairman of the Bosnian Federal Commission for Missing Persons. He has been involved in finding missing persons
and the recovery of remains since the time of the war.

23

International Commission on Missing Persons, “Srebrenica Figures as of 02 July 2015,” Press Release, accessed
September 11, 2018, https://www.icmp.int/news/infographic-provides-latest-facts-and-figures-on-srebrenicagenocide/.

24

International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, February 26, 2007, accessed July 12, 2017, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/09120070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. More information about this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro
can be accessed here: http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/91/judgments.

25

More information about ICTY Srebrenica cases available here, accessed December 14, 2017, http://www.icty.org/
specials/srebrenica20/?q=srebrenica20/.

26

James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, ed., History: The Journal of the Historical Association, Vol. 98, Issue 4, No. 332 (2013).

27

Helen Lennon, “A Witness to Atrocity: Film as Evidence in International War Crimes,” in Holocaust and the Moving Image:
Representations in Film and Television since 1933, ed. Toby Haggith and Joanna Newman (London: Thomson Press,
2005), 67.
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likely the most well-known, and contains images that have forever shaped public perceptions of
the Holocaust, and in particular, the camps. Such films, containing images of atrocity, represent
some of the most powerful obstacles to denial available. In the context of ICTY trials, there were at
least six hundred video exhibits in the unfinished trial of Slobodan Milošević.28 In that case, as in
others, the question of authenticity of footage was a key point of contention.29
As Helen Lennon demonstrates, images can be immediate, spontaneous, and chillingly
succinct. They can be circulated rapidly, viewed by many individuals at once, and permanently
archived in collective memory.30 What the Scorpions video depicts, similar to images from Nazi
camps, is the labor that was necessary to exterminate people, and the matter-of-factness with which
this was done. It is precisely that, writes Judith Keilbach, which causes a shock.31 It is the ease that
comes with this labor, so painfully obvious in the Scorpions footage that is perplexing.
The Scorpions video, and evidence like it, stands alongside some of the previous examples
of visually documenting atrocity crimes, as they are committed. That is why records i.e. evidence
material such as documents, testimony and other moving or still images, are important for creating
a narrative about past events—both in and out of the courtroom. All of that evidence works in
concert to tell a story. Wilson wrote about history in international criminal trials,32 and others
studied the use of historical forensic evidence in court33, and the potential of the ICTY archive
specifically, as a rich resource for researchers interested in the former Yugoslavia.34 There is thus
substantial agreement about evidence presented in trial having an important role in historical
research.
Audiovisual records and images of executions from the wars that engulfed the former Yugoslavia
in the 1990s, are rare.35 One other example comes from the ICTY trial of Goran Jelisić, for crimes
in Brčko, early on in the conflict, in 1992.36 In that trial, still images of Jelisić executing unarmed
men have been included in the trial record.37 Videos recorded by perpetrators themselves—during
the act of killing—where what they say is audible, are even harder to find. The Scorpions video is
thus a unique opportunity to come closer to the act, in order to scrutinize it. While doing that, the
men whose lives were so brutally cut short are nevertheless not removed from the analysis. From
here, the article proceeds in three sections. The first discusses the unit whose members committed
the murders in the video in question. The second analyzes the nineteen minutes of video in detail,
taking apart some of the spoken, and unspoken, elements of it. Finally, the third section looks at the
judicial and social aftermath of the release of the video, primarily within Serbian society.
This article is the result of a critical assessment of primary sources from trials, and attentive
viewing of the video, that enabled a scrutiny of the spoken and the unspoken in it. Conclusions
are based on juxtaposing the video with elements of various trial records, and interpreting them

28

Lennon, A Witness to Atrocity, 69.

29

Ibid.; More on the Milošević trial, see: Gideon Boas, The Milosevic Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of Complex International
Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Timothy Waters, ed., The Milosevic Trial, An
Autopsy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Judith Armatta, Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan
Milosevic (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic: The Unfinished Trial
(Routledge, 2016).

30

Lennon, A Witness to Atrocity, 66

31

Judith Keilbach, “Photographs, Symbolic Images, and the Holocaust: On the (Im)possibility of Depicting Historical
Truth,” History and Theory, Theme Issue 47 (2009), 54-76.

32

Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

33

Vladimir Petrović, The Emergence of Historical Forensic Expertise: Clio Takes the Stand (New York: Routledge, 2017).

34

Iva Vukušić, “The Archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” History: The Journal of the
Historical Association, Vol. 98, Issue 4, No. 332 (2013).

35

It is entirely possible that more recordings and images exists, but they have not surfaced yet, and have not been used in
court.

36

Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Trial Judgment, December 14, 1999, IT-95-10, accessed on July 30, 2017 http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf. More about Goran Jelisić can be found in the book by Slavenka Drakulić, They
Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in The Hague (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 66.

37

Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Image, Exhibit P3, December 1, 1998, IT-95-10, accessed on July 20, 2017, http://icr.icty.org/
LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Exhibit/Indexable/IT-95-10/ACE2782R0000021509.jpg.
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together. The exploration thus includes words spoken by the same individuals in the video, and
later, at their trial in Belgrade in 2005, and 2006. The article further draws on the records of other
proceedings relating to Srebrenica, primarily those of Popović et al., Zdravko Tolimir, Ratko Mladić
and Radovan Karadžić.
The Scorpions Unit
The Scorpions are one of the most long-lasting units in the entire Yugoslav conflict between
1991, when violence erupted in Croatia, until 1999, when it ravaged Kosovo. In that period, it
changed shapes and affiliations, at least on paper, but its core remained largely the same.38 It was
a paramilitary unit, operated covertly, like other units such as Željko Ražnatović Arkan’s Serbian
Volunteer Guard, under the umbrella of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and specifically,
its State Security Service.39 The unit was named after a type of weapon originally developed in
Czechoslovakia and later produced in Yugoslavia. The unit first became active in Croatia, being
tasked with securing the newly conquered oil fields in Slavonija, a rich region in the east, close to
the border with Serbia. Their base was in Đeletovci, a small town on the eastern edge of Croatia,
then held by a mix of forces including the Yugoslav People’s Army, local Serbs and units from
Serbia proper. The Scorpions’ war path is marked in particular by the executions some of the
members committed in the hamlet of Godinjske bare near Trnovo, Bosnia, in 1995, and the murders
they carried out in the small town of Podujevo, Kosovo, four years later.40 What is particularly
interesting about this unit is that the members often originated from the same town, and were
relatives, friends and acquaintances long before the war. That, according to one member, brought
a special sense of closeness to the unit.41
The Scorpions were established early on in the war, as local Serbs rebelled against Croatian
independence, and formed the para-state called Republika Srpska Krajina.42 The initial guarding of
the oil fields was part of resource exploitation that funded the war effort, and made some of those
involved rich.43 They fought alongside the army of the Republika Srpska Krajina, within which
they were incorporated, and later with the Bosnian Serb Army. Finally, after the wars in Bosnia and
Croatia, the Scorpions became the reserve of the Special Anti-terrorist unit of the Serbian Ministry
of Internal Affairs.44 Apart from oil, they were involved in widespread harvesting of local highquality oak that they transported out of the territory, and sold.45 There are instances of the Serbian
State Security providing them with IDs, and a salary.46 According to some of the members, the

38

Dejan Anastasijević, “Kratka istorija paravojnih jedinica u jugoslavenskim ratovima 1991-1995 – Grabljive zveri i
otrovne bube,” YU Historija, n.d., accessed on July 25, 2017, http://www.yuhistorija.com/serbian/ratovi_91_99_txt01c.
html; Miloš Vasić and Filip Švarm, “Paramilitary Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000,” in In the Triangle of State Power:
Army, Police, Paramilitary Units, ed. Stipe Sikavica (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001).

39

Anastasijević, Kratka istorija paravojnih jedinica u jugoslavenskim ratovima, James Gow, The Serbian Project and its
Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst & Company, 2003).

40

Saša Cvjetan has been tried for the crime in Podujevo, where fourteen Albanians were killed, and at least five children
wounded in March 1999. Cvjetan was convicted in Belgrade in 2005, just days after the Scorpions video was released
in The Hague. Tanja Tagirov, “Škorpion pred sudom,” Vreme, June 16, 2005, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.vreme.
com/cms/view.php?id=419054.

41

Lazar Stojanović, Škorpioni Spomenar, film (2007; Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center), min 28, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=nqsDRw04Z6U; Fond za humanitarno pravo, Škorpioni od zločina do pravde, 2008, accessed July 24, 2017,
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Skorpioni.pdf.

42

Anastasijević, Kratka istorija paravojnih jedinica u jugoslavenskim ratovima; Miloš Vasić and Filip Švarm, “Paramilitary
Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000,” in In the Triangle of State Power: Army, Police, Paramilitary Units, ed. Stipe Sikavica
(Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001).

43

Miloš Vasić, “Poreklo moći i bogatstva,” Vreme, June 16, 2005, accessed July 30, 2017, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.
php?id=419055.

44

Helsinški odbor, Slučaj Škorpioni, Peščanik, September 14, 2008, accessed July 20, 2017, http://pescanik.net/slucajskorpioni/.

45

Helsinški odbor, Slučaj Škorpioni.

46

Dejan Anastasijević, “Ubod Škorpiona,” Vreme, December 25, 2003, accessed July 21, 2017, http://www.vreme.com/cms/
view.php?id=361981.
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pay in the unit was better than that in other units active at the time.47 The unit’s insignia evolved
with time, including an image of a scorpion superimposed on a black background, and the Serbian
three-colored flag. When deployed in Bosnia, the members were advised to remove their insignia,
so in case of capture, they could deny which unit they belonged to.48
This unit is well known for its engagement in the Yugoslav wars, their notoriety brought about
in no small measure by the video, and the trials where members were convicted for crimes in
Trnovo and Podujevo. Arguably, its notoriety has not eclipsed that of Arkan’s men, also captured
in action, this time by a photographer, Ron Haviv, earlier in the war.49 The profile of Scorpions
commander Slobodan Medić Boca was, after all, no match for Arkan’s, who was a state security hit
man, bank-robber with an active Interpol arrest warrant and international notoriety, a paramilitary
leader, a political party president and parliament representative, a cultural icon married to a folk
star, and a football manager.50
Units like the Scorpions were useful to the Serbian regime, as they provided plausible
deniability—the opportunity for the regime to distance itself from the unlawful, the illegitimate
and the unsavory part of the conquest of territory.51 The Scorpions’ warpath, as of the other
paramilitaries, is best described by the writings and work of Dejan Anastasijević, Filip Švarm and
Miloš Vasić, all Serbian journalists.52 Scholars, such as Schlichte, Horncastle, Milichevic, Vivod,
Čolović, and others wrote about the characteristics of those units, and their role in the war.
The Scorpions Video
Wednesday, June 1, 2005, was supposed to be a regular court day in The Hague, at the ICTY,
where Milošević was facing charges for crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Kosovo, during the 1990s. That day, witness Obrad Stevanović was on the stand, former assistant
to the minister of internal affairs in Serbia, testifying in the former president’s defense. Stevanović
was claiming that, essentially, Serbia’s institutions had nothing whatsoever to do with whatever
happened in Srebrenica.53 During the cross-examination, prosecutor Geoffrey Nice played the
video of the murders in Trnovo, in order to counter the witnesses’ claim. Milošević, and his courtappointed counsel, Steven Kay, both objected, questioning authenticity, connections to Srebrenica,
and accusing the prosecution of purposefully being manipulative, constructing relationships
between the murders and the Serbian state. In the months that followed, the video proved to be
authentic, showing a Serbian unit shooting unarmed men. The video was ultimately not admitted
into evidence in the Milošević trial, but in the trials that followed it became immensely important.54

47

Fond za humanitarno pravo, Škorpioni od zločina do pravde, 108.

48

Stojanović, Škorpioni Spomenar, min 37; Fond za humanitarno pravo, Škorpioni od zločina.

49

Vladimir Petrović, “Power(lessness) of Atrocity Images: Bijeljina Photos between Perpetration and Prosecution of
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, 9 (2015), accessed July 20, 2017,
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The video was filmed by a member of the unit, Slobodan Stojković Bugar. It was not intended
for publication and sharing widely, and thus, depicts members of the Scorpions unit, presumably,
doing what they do, in its truest form. If it can be at all said that they are performing, then they
are performing for those immediately around them, and possibly others who approve of the act.
The video also shows that, at that time, even though this was two years after the establishment of
the ICTY, these men had no fear about recording a murder, nor particular worries that it may lead
to them being prosecuted for what they have done. In 1995, the ICTY was hardly a considerable
threat, barely a case or two in the making, not yet powerful enough in the eyes of those men who
probably thought they were engaging in legitimate state business. This is, furthermore, an amateur
video—it only films, somewhat with a shaky hand, what was—there does not seem to be much of
an agenda behind it. The video includes Scorpions banter, jokes, and what seems to be unrehearsed
behavior.
The nineteen minutes that show the execution are actually part of a two-hour collage, filmed
largely by Scorpions member Duško Kosanović Sova, who on that fateful day was not present. Sova
had had, as he described, a fight with the commander the day before, and left.55 The camera stayed,
and Slobodan Stojković Bugar took over the filming duties. As part of the collage, the viewer can
see scenes from a blessing ceremony, where an orthodox priest named Gavrilo sends the men off
to go to the war theater, asking the almighty to give strength to the most faithful Serbian army to
fight and win against the enemy of the Serbian people.56
The answer to the question of why the execution was filmed is still largely speculative.57
Journalist, researchers and analysts looked into statements made by members of the unit, the
commander Boca, the videographer, trying to understand the reasoning behind the decision to
film. During the trial Boca responded to the judges’ question about why he ordered it to be filmed
with a counter question, asking, essentially, if the judge thought he was an idiot. Boca was, clearly,
becoming well aware of the judicial value of this footage.58
Pero Petrašević, one of the members of the unit who was charged but, unlike others, pleaded
guilty, told the court that Boca seemed visibly agitated as he issued the order to his closest
subordinates, all members of his personal security detail, which made Petrašević think that Boca
himself received the order to execute these men. Petrašević immediately asked his commander why
the execution was being filmed, to which Boca told him to relax, suggesting the footage would later
be deleted. Petrašević speculated that the video was created in order to prove to those that issued
the order to Boca, that the execution indeed took place. If that is true, and executions were being
filmed, why has no other footage emerged by now? However, once back in Đeletovci, Petrašević
realized that some of the men who were not deployed around Trnovo saw the footage and then
it occurred to him that recording it was the stupidest thing to do.59 The videographer of most
of the other footage, Sova, spoke about filming as one would about documenting an interesting
excursion, to make something of a memento to their time in the field. Was the execution video a
memento, or not, it is hard to know.
According to the testimony of Slobodan Stojković Bugar, he was filming simply because Sova

55

Stojanović, Škorpioni Spomenar, min 32-34; Fond za humanitarno pravo, Škorpioni od zločina. In his testimony, Slobodan
Stojković Bugar claims that Sova got ill and that was the reason he returned home, 348, http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/Skorpioni.pdf.

56

The segment depicting the ceremony with the orthodox priest can be viewed here, accessed on July 30, 2017, http://
srebrenica.sense-agency.com/en/.

57

Multiple theories were presented through the years about why the camera was there, and none was so far proven. One
was centered on the assumption that the State Security demanded to record the shootings, as a proof that they were
done. That theory would mean that there may be other images and footage still to be uncovered. Another theory is
that they filmed themselves on their own accord, but that this was not done in order to have a memento, but as a
way to pressure the State Security with potentially uncovering the story of the murders, and speaking publicly about
who gave them the order to execute the men. A similar theory is that the footage was made in order to keep the
executioners in line, as leverage against them ever going to the authorities to rat out their comrades.

58

Fond za humanitarno pravo, Škorpioni od zločina, 59.

59

Ibid., 92

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.2.1527

Vukušić

42

was not there to do it.60 While testifying in the trial in Belgrade, Bugar stated that, overall, the
unit was being filmed so that the commander would have the recording as a souvenir. Sova was
apparently brought into the unit with the particular task of filming.61 Slobodan Stojković Bugar
recalled, during the Scorpions Belgrade trial, that on the morning of the event, he was told by
the commander to go and film “it,” and said that he did not ask what precisely “it” was. This is
what Bugar was told, according to his testimony, by Slobodan Medić Boca, as he was instructing
the others to go complete the assignment.62 The commander, Boca, gave a completely different
account. He was claiming in court that he had nothing to do with the crime, that he did not order
it and that most certainly, he had nothing to do with it being taped. According to Boca, he had
learned of the event much later.63 If he had known that a crime had taken place and that someone
filmed it, Boca stated, “Ja bih ga ko zeca ubio” or “I would have killed him like a rabbit.”64
The commander’s position during the entire trial was that he did not order any execution, and
that his men acted independently. That is a claim all but one of his former subordinates rejected.65
According to Pero Petrašević, Boca issued an order—to kill the “soldiers” in the truck. According
to Boca, they were captured soldiers.66 The accused Petrašević, like others such as the cameraman
Slobodan Stojković Bugar, testified that Boca was an authority in the unit and that his men
respected him.67 Without the commander’s approval, they could not move from their positions.68
To the judges at the opening of the trial, Petrašević said that in front of god, he is guilty, but what
the judges have to determine is if he is guilty for executing an order in war.69
The video circulated in the town of Šid, somewhat underground, among members of the
unit, their supporters, and others with some connections to the right people. In 2004, the tape was
given by one of the Scorpions to the NGO Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), a well-known Serbian
human rights organization specializing in documenting crimes and wartime abuses. Nataša
Kandić, the head of the Center, approached the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukčević
and demanded action. Action did, after significant pressure, follow.70 During that period, another
tape with the same content, originating in Bosnia, found its way to the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office
in The Hague. As this case shows, secrets like this are hard to keep when there is a tape recording
somewhere.
The Execution
From the crime after the fall of Srebrenica, and the set of events that create that cluster of organized,
systematic executions, this particular fragment of video emerges to depict the atrocity. The relevant
bit of the video, for the purposes of this article, begins in the back of a truck. Men are seen on the
floor, and it is difficult to see where one person ends, and another begins. We see the legs of a
Scorpions member later identified later as Pero Petrašević, sitting in the back of the truck, wearing
army boots. All of a sudden, one boot kicks a body on the floor: “Šta se treseš, pička ti materina?” or
“Why are you shaking, you motherfucker?”71
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Members of the unit around the truck make comments about the detainees smelling badly.
The Scorpions use particular words one would use with a toddler, and a particularly high-pitched
voice, when suggesting that the men defecated, and urinated on themselves. They do this to mock
them, make them feel emasculated. It is worth remembering, the killings took place in July, and the
detainees have probably been captured several days before. It was a hot summer, and temperatures
rose upwards of 30 degrees Celsius. They probably had not eaten or drank in days, not to mention
showered, or changed their clothes.
After the initial few minutes where the camera is pointing to the group of people on the floor,
in the back of the truck, we see them emerge from the truck, while the Scorpions yell at them
“yalla, yalla,”72 Arabic for “come on, come on”, and asking rhetorical questions such as if they were
rushing when they were murdering Serbs. The unit members yell, go on, on your knees — “klanjaj,
pička vam materina” — “pray, motherfuckers,”73 a reference to the Muslim prayer, performed on the
knees. Both the term “yalla” and the reference to Muslim prayer seem to be used to re-confirm the
identity of the detainees as non-Christians, Islamists, Turks, and undeserving of humane, dignified
treatment.74
“Kad si Srbe ubijao, nisi čeko’, pička ti materina.”
“When you murdered Serbs, you didn’t wait around, did you, you motherfucker.”75

The unit members taunt the prisoners, saying they will kill two of them, and let four go—the
four best ones. One person lying in the ditch says, calmly, “ubijte me, al’ dajte mi vode”—“kill me,
but give me water.” The unit members respond with: “silence, head down!”76 There is no evidence
of the Scorpions ever trying to check if the men they had in their custody were suspected of any
crimes, or if they were soldiers. For them, it seemed enough that they were Muslims, and that
was the reason these men were killed. That is what Pero Petrašević said to the mothers and family
members of the victims in court, after pleading guilty: “Ubili smo ih zato što su bili Muslimani” or
“We killed them because they were Muslims.”77
The six detainees jumping out of the truck were rushed to a nearby ditch, next to the road,
where they were told to lie down. The first to jump out was seventeen-year old Safet Fejzić. The
detainees were dirty, their clothes stained and wrinkled, at least one of them had what looks like
blood and swelling on his face, and shoeless… Their hands were tied behind their backs. They
looked at the floor at all times. They spoke little, and mostly in response to questions. The younger
among them seemed particularly petrified, their shoulders down, as if trying to become so small
that they would disappear from that moment, from that place. Once on their feet again, the
members of the Scorpions unit kept yelling at the prisoners to move quicker.
Once the men are out of the truck, it was easier to see them, and they were identified as: Safet
Fejzić (17 at time of death), Azmir Alispahić (17), Sidik Salkić (36), Smail Ibrahimović (35), Dino
Salihović (16), Juso Delić (25). That identification was confirmed as bodies were found close to the
execution site around the time the video became public, and DNA analysis established that it was
indeed them. In sharp contrast to the mood and appearance of the captured men and boys, are the
72
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Figure 1. Scorpions member standing next to the victims.
members of the unit surrounding them. They seem well fed, and well dressed, in dark uniforms,
some wearing red berets, carrying rifles. Some of them are bulky and muscular. There are one or
two seemingly older men, while the rest look to be in their twenties. They comment, with laughter
and slight irritation, when the filmmaker yells out, somewhat bemused, that the battery ran out,
and that he would have to rush back to the camp for a full one. It is then clear that what is about to
happen could not happen without a camera present.
We hear another Scorpions member, Aleksandar Medić, turn towards the 17-year old Azmir
on the ground and say: “Jesi li prcao? … E pa ni nećeš” or “Have you ever fucked? … Well, you
won’t.”78
If it is not clear up to that point to the viewer, what is going on, at this precise moment, it
becomes clear. There is no doubt in the minds of those present about what is about to happen.
Interestingly, the same man, Aleksandar, who spoke those horrible words to the petrified young
man—did not shoot when the time for it came. Aleksandar Medić kept his barrel raised in the air,
and he did not fire just minutes after this short conversation took place. For it, he suffered ridicule
and humiliation from his comrades.79
In the video, men walk around carrying weapons, while captives lie in the dirt next to a road.
After that, they are escorted to a nearby meadow, lined up in tall grass, close to some holiday
cottages long unused due to war, and shot. Each victim looks on, as others standing in front are
shot in the back by outbursts of fire. One by one, four fall down. Two are left to pick up the four
bodies, their hands now untied, and take them inside an abandoned house.80
As the two carry the bodies, they are advised not to look at the faces, presumably not to
feel sick, as they drag the lifeless bodies away. The last two men are then shot. Just before that,
one of the two asked to drink some water he saw in a bowl, or ashtray, on the windowsill of the
abandoned house. He was allowed to do so.81 One of the unit members then used his last remaining
bullets on them, while another walks in and says he’ll ‘stamp’ them, meaning—put another bullet
in their heads, just to make sure they are dead. As they inspect the bodies, a unit member says “a u
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Figure 2. Victims being escorted to the execution site.
pičku materinu, ovaj jos diše” or “For fucks’ sake, this one is still breathing.”82 After the members of
the unit make sure the last victim is dead, they leave the house. Bodies are then left, piled up in the
corner. When they were found, as Amor Mašović had testified, their bones were burned, and that
made the process of DNA extraction and identification harder.83
The victims never pleaded for their lives, even when it became painfully clear that they were
about to end. They never fought, or tried to escape. They asked for water, and asserted their
innocence when taunted and accused of abusing Serbs. None of it mattered. The perpetrators did
not face any punishment at the time, and members of the same unit deployed again, in four years
time, to Kosovo. In this respect, it can be argued that a lack of punishment for the execution in
Trnovo made the crime in Podujevo in 1999, more likely.
The Consequences
The executed men were found in shallow graves close to the execution site, identified, and returned
to families for proper burial. However, at the time when the video was released, members of the
families were shocked to see it replayed on TV, over and over again. Until then some were still
probably holding on to some hope that their loved ones may be alive, somewhere, maybe in a
detention camp. As the video was released, that hope was shattered. Azmir Alispahić’s mother
turned on the TV to watch the evening news that day, while in a refugee camp near Tuzla, Bosnia,
and then she saw him. He was the second in line to get shot. She recalls the men in the video
pushing him, and just seconds later they shot him. She said to those interviewing her: “no one can
understand how I feel.”
The son of Sidik Salkić spoke publicly, many years later, about seeing his father being
murdered, on TV, while living as a refugee in Australia. Sidik worked in the hospital in Srebrenica,
and his son remembered his father wearing the same blue shirt on the video, that he wore when
they said goodbye, as Srebrenica was falling.84 He was wearing that same shirt that his son had
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seen him wear countless times before.85 Hana Fejzić recognized her seventeen-year-old son Safet
Fejzić in the footage and testified about it in court. She said that he was wearing the tracksuit she
bought for him.86
The experiences of family members of these victims raise an important ethical question: do
families need to be identified, contacted, and consulted, before any footage of this sort is broadcast
in court? The answer is yes, whenever possible, absolutely. There is no need for families to be
further traumatized by insensitive judicial institutions. In cases where there are conflicts between
the needs and desires of families of victims with respect to evidence like this, and the requirements
put forward by the judicial process, relatives need to be consulted, informed and warned, and
treated with utmost care and respect, as to avoid inflicting additional harm. A separate issue
concerns the ethical use of images like this in the media (in this case, in particular TV and print).
Following the video being shown in the ICTY courtroom, it was broadcast at least two thousand
times, and TV stations in Serbia and Bosnia showed it more than 500 times.87 That in itself made
it impossible for most family members to escape seeing it, repeatedly, for weeks. The pain and
anguish that that caused the family members of the victims is difficult to imagine.
Judicial and Social Aftermath
Srebrenica-Related Trials
Broadly speaking, in war crimes trials, there are two kinds of evidence presented by the prosecution:
crime-base and linkage.88 Furthermore, there is lead evidence, and corroborative evidence.89 For
judges, evidence must work well together to convincingly prove allegations. For anyone working
on prosecuting those cases, crime-based evidence tends to be easier to obtain, verify, and present
in court because it speaks about a crime that was committed, and those immediately at the crime
scene. It may contain testimonies of eyewitnesses, survivors, and alike. Linkage, on the other hand,
focuses on those higher up the chain of command, most often far away from the crime scene, who
claim they had no intention to commit any crime, had no information their troops were engaging
in crimes, and whoever may have transgressed was doing so on their own accord, and not based on
any orders. Linkage is necessary to convict anyone higher up—it needs to prove that commanders
and politicians ordered, or were aware of what was happening, and intended the outcome, or
at least tolerated it, and that troops were acting under a functioning authority. In this case, the
Scorpions video was proof that a crime had been committed by a unit, which was, we now know,
affiliated with the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.90
The emergence of the video had a great impact on trials going on in The Hague and in Serbia.
In the days after its release, members of the Scorpions were arrested, and in the following two years
faced trial at the newly established War Crimes Chamber at the Belgrade District Court.91 This video
made it impossible to paint Srebrenica as a purely Bosnian Serb affair, completely detached from
Belgrade. The video has been shown in multiple ICTY trials after 2005, and is currently among the
most important visual evidence in the retrial of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović. Key postInsajder, Paravojna Jedinica Škorpioni, film (2006; Belgrade: TV B92), min 18, 28, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hQNePutCvPk.
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2005 ICTY Srebrenica trials include Zdravko Tolimir, Popović et al., and Radovan Karadžić and
Ratko Mladić (both currently awaiting appeal judgments). In those trials, a number of Bosnian
Serb officers were convicted of genocide and other crimes, for executions following the fall of
Srebrenica.92 In November 2017, Mladić heard the first instance judgment, sentencing him to life
imprisonment.93
For the purposes of this article, the focus is on those who actually committed the massacre, and
not those who ordered it, or have done nothing to prevent it, or punish the lower-level perpetrators
in the aftermath. That is because the video and testimony of unit members in subsequent trials
speak volumes about these men, the unit, and the crime they committed. After the footage was
released, some of them were charged, along with their commander (who was not at the execution
site and is not captured on video). The accused were commander Slobodan Medić Boca (39 at time
of charging), Pero Petrašević (36), Aleksandar Medić Zara (38), Aleksandar Vukov Vuk (33) and
Branislav Medić Zekan (36). The trial had flaws critics were eager to point out, such as the fact that
genocide was not charged and that the court was not convinced that the victims had anything to
do with Srebrenica, but overall, it was fair to the accused, and a step in the right direction for Serbia
and its judiciary.94
The Scorpions were charged with committing crimes against civilians, a war crime.95 Slobodan
Medić and Branislav Medić were convicted to the maximum available sentence, twenty years
in prison, while Aleksandar Medić got five. Aleksandar Vukov was acquitted. Pero Petrašević,
after pleading guilty, was sentenced to thirteen years in prison.96 The Supreme Court largely
upheld convictions, but reduced Branislav Medić’s sentence to 15 years, and returned the case of
Aleksandar Medić for retrial.97
Other trials were conducted in the following years. Slobodan Davidović Boda, and Milorad
Momić, both members of the unit present at the execution, were tried in Croatia. Both were
convicted.98 On December 31st 2013, as he was on his way to the New Years’ celebration with his
wife and seventeen-year old son, Slobodan Medić Boca, the commander of the Scorpions, was
killed by a drunk driver. The Toyota Medić’s family was in, was crushed. His wife and son were
killed too.99 Boca was out of prison for the holidays, something that was later heavily criticized by
human rights advocates and the families of the victims.100
Impact of the Video on Serbian Society
In the days after it was released, reactions poured in, and politicians and public figures gave
statements with varying degrees of genuine shock, and demands for justice.101 The video was
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viewed by many, and quickly, as the Milošević trial was followed by the media with greater
attention than any other trial.102 Nothing like this video had ever been shown in mainstream media
in Serbia. There were also outright denials following the video being released, coming mostly
from the nationalist right.103 Serbian politicians, to this day, in accepting facts from Srebrenica and
referring publicly to it, tend to, with the very next breath, refer to crimes suffered by Serbs. While
it is absolutely true that Serb civilians suffered as victims of crimes, no genocide was established to
have been committed against them in the 1990s wars.104 However, in an attempt to equalize, balance
and dismiss any notion that troops fighting for the Serbian political project perpetrated a crime that
is in any way different from other crimes in the 1990s, politicians emphasize crimes against Serbs. It
is rare to hear a singular acceptance of what happened after Srebrenica fell, without the mandatory
“but” coming right after it.
As for the social aftermath of the release of the video, now, more than twelve years on, it is clear
that its impact was limited, but it did fundamentally change how Srebrenica is perceived. Serbian
journalist and ICTY prosecution witness Dejan Anastasijević concluded that there would always
be a number of people who will deny that any crime was committed. There are those that will,
because of political interests or direct involvement, refuse to acknowledge the crimes no matter the
evidence. However, in the aftermath of the video, the average Serbian citizen will, Anastasijević
argues, probably think twice before saying that no crimes were committed in Srebrenica, or that it
was not really a big deal.105
Importantly, Serbian civil society, and organizations like the Helsinki Committee, and the
Humanitarian Law Center, continue to work tirelessly on disseminating important facts about
Srebrenica in Serbia. In 2017, the HLC released a dossier that concluded, based on credible evidence,
that Serbian institutions were responsible for turning men who fled from Bosnian Serb troops after
the fall of Srebrenica and reached Serbia, right over to those that would later kill them.106
Conclusion
The Scorpions video is among some of the most recognizable imagery of the Yugoslav wars,
alongside Ron Haviv’s series of images of Arkan’s unit in Bijeljina in April 1992, and the footage
British journalists filmed in the summer of the same year in Omarska and Trnopolje, two large
camps close to Prijedor in western Bosnia. That material has been made part of the trial record
in numerous cases, in multiple jurisdictions, most notably in The Hague. For Srebrenica, we also
have the footage Serbian journalist Zoran Petrović Piroćanac filmed while being embedded with
Bosnian Serb forces after the fall of Srebrenica. Out of that footage, a few seconds depicting dead
bodies in front of the Kravica warehouse, is most relevant. Those images helped prosecutors prove
the organized and systematic expulsions, detentions and executions. In the case of Srebrenica, they
helped prove genocide.
However, there is only one video of executions that has emerged—the video discussed in this
article. The killing of the six men and boys sometime after July 16, 1995, in a hamlet near Trnovo,
almost two hundred kilometers from Srebrenica, was, unlike others, recorded. In that respect, it is
different than other mass executions at sites like the Kravica warehouse, Orahovac, the Petkovci
dam, Kozluk, Pilica or Branjevo farm, all locations of mass executions in the aftermath of the fall of
Srebrenica. The murder of the six unarmed men took place after the mass executions that followed
in the week after July 11, but is part of the efficient system of killing the Bosnian Serb Army, and
in particular its security apparatus, aided by the police, committed in various locations around
eastern Bosnia.
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This video provides, in the words of the perpetrators themselves, a sense of just what sort of
humiliation the victims had to go through before they were murdered. It gives insight into how the
victims were perceived by the perpetrators: as weak, unmanly, dirty and smelly. The victims were
yelled at and insulted. Victims were thirsty, a particular detail that already emerged in previous
Srebrenica trials at the ICTY.107 As evidence, the video was crucial in proving that Srebrenica was
not a completely Bosnian Serb affair, with which Belgrade’s institutions had nothing whatsoever
to do with. As Dejan Anastasijević argued, the Scorpions were not a Bosnian Serb unit. This video
was the key evidence proving participation of units from Serbia proper in the crimes committed
after the fall of Srebrenica.108
For prosecuting mass atrocity crimes, it is further important to point out that this video has
not only been used to prosecute individuals up the chain of command, but has served to pressure
Serbian institutions into arresting and prosecuting members of the Scorpions unit that committed
the crime. Without the video, these men almost certainly would not have been held accountable. It
is unlikely they would have come forward on their own. What the developments surrounding the
video prove is that evidence like this can push institutions into action. It can, however briefly, open
the space for discussions about what was done in war, and in whose name.109 The question remains,
how many murderers and war criminals are currently on the streets of the former Yugoslavia,
because they were never shortsighted enough to film what they were doing?
The Scorpions told stories of unit honor and sacrifice in court, about how life on the frontline
is hard, and how they obeyed orders. As the trial transcripts show, the unit commander denied
having anything to do with the crime, and members claimed they were ordered to do it, and put
on the spot with little choice. They argued that commander Boca had absolute power and that they
would never have done something like that without clear instructions, as he was perceived to be a
tough commander, and one that does not tolerate disobedience.
The video and subsequent trial record show that the perpetrators had no doubt about what
they were doing, and that there was little insecurity or remorse. Maybe the fact that Aleksandar did
not shoot can be interpreted as insecurity, and Petrašević pleading guilty could be understood as a
sign of remorse. However, some members seemed to have enjoyed the act of killing. They seemed
absolutely untouched by what they had done and their acts appeared to be part of a routine—
nothing in their behavior suggested that this was in any way a new situation for them. In the years
after, unit members did not come forward, tormented by guilt, to confess their crime.
What the video reveals about perpetrators is that they escape simplistic qualifications and
labelling as monsters or sadistic psychopaths.110 Reading the words of Pero Petrašević in the
Scorpions trial in Belgrade, one sees a man who regrets his act, and claims the duty to obey orders
was the reason why he did what he did that day. But do orders justify him kicking a man, while he’s
on the floor, in the back of a truck? He is the one in the video who asked a frightened detainee why
the fuck he was shaking. Aleksandar Medić, who teased with vulgar jokes a 17-year old who was
lying on the ground, waiting to be shot, did not pull the trigger when the time came to do so. He
was later resented for it by his peers. Not all members of notorious units participate in committing
crimes, and some later step forward and speak about the acts of their comrades, sometimes putting
their own lives in grave danger, and subjecting themselves to pressure, threats, and rejection by
their social circles. For men like Goran Stoparić, a former Scorpions member who came forward
and spoke out, it was anything but easy to testify; yet he has done so repeatedly.
The video and subsequent trial in Belgrade emerged as a result of the dedication and persistence
of one individual in particular, Nataša Kandić, an iron-willed human rights advocate. As in other
cases around the globe, when it comes to facing the past, human rights groups are the ones pressing
for it. The role of HLC in this particular case proves the importance of civil society engagement
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in the painful process of facing the past in Serbia.111 As unsuccessful as this process seems to be at
times, the existence of this video did show, quite literally, to people in Serbia, that men in uniforms,
speaking Serbian, did kill unarmed victims in the aftermath of Srebrenica. Up until that point, there
was still doubt about Srebrenica in much of Serbian society, and the notion that it was all some
kind of fabrication to vilify the Serbs still held, especially in nationalist circles. After the Scorpions
video came out, that is no longer the case.112 As Orentlicher wrote when referring to the trials at
the ICTY, what took place was a “shrinking space for denial”113, however briefly.114 That is what
happened: today, only those at the very margins of the political discourse would claim nothing at
all happened in Srebrenica. There is widespread recognition that the massacre took place, albeit
often coupled with efforts to minimize the number of victims.
Currently, the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals in The Hague, the daughterinstitution of sorts to the ICTY, is conducting the re-trial of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović,
the former head of the Serbian State Security, and his trusted associate. They are charged with
crimes committed by units such as the Scorpions, as the two accused were, according to the
prosecutors, responsible for their establishment, training, financing and deployment. The crimes
charged include persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, a crime against humanity,
and murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war, committed in a number of municipalities
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.115 They were previously tried by the ICTY, and acquitted
in 2013, in a controversial decision based on a particular understanding, later dismissed by judges
as erroneous, of aiding and abetting as a mode of liability.116 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
then returned the case for re-trial.117
In sum, what these nineteen minutes of horror have shown us was tragic, and painful, but also
something we had to know if we wanted to know about Srebrenica, the crime that was committed,
and the men that committed it. Without it, one could still ask: was it really that horrific? After this
video we can confidently say, yes it was, it was that horrific, and worse. It is nineteen minutes of
what is among the worst things imaginable that a human being can be subjected to, and that must
not be forgotten. Thanks to the evidence that was collected and used in court, and this video, it
cannot be.
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